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Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labour Supply
* 
 
We investigate spillovers in spousal labour supply exploiting independent variation in hours 
worked generated by the introduction of the shorter workweek in France in the late 1990s. 
We find that female and male employees treated by the shorter legal workweek reduce their 
weekly labour supply by about 2 hours, and do not experience any reduction in their monthly 
earnings. While wives of treated men do not seem to adjust their working time at either the 
intensive or extensive margins, husbands of treated wives respond by cutting their workweek 
by about half an hour to one hour, according to specifications and samples. In particular, 
managers and professionals respond much more strongly to the shorter legal workweek in 
their wives’ firms than men in lower occupations. These effects are consistent with the 
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Complementarities in labour supply and leisure time have long been identified as a key policy 
issue, as they represent an important channel through which reforms targeted at specific 
segments of the population can ultimately affect a wider sample of individuals. For example, 
work-sharing reforms can affect the value of leisure time in all layers of society, even when 
they are implemented in a few industries only (Alesina et al. 2005). When the value of leisure 
time for individuals depends on the amount of leisure enjoyed by their family members, co-
workers, neighbours, social contacts, etc., reforms of the welfare state, or tax reforms, or 
changes in workweek regulations aimed at some segments of the workforce may impact 
individual behaviour well beyond the targeted population.  
While spillover effects in leisure and work represent an important and controversial 
issue, there is still little micro-economic evidence on the actual magnitude of these effects. 
One major difficulty is that changes in leisure time and working hours for individuals are in 
most cases associated with important changes in their earnings. Thus the labour supply 
responses of ‘peers’ cannot be interpreted as reflecting pure cross-hour effects, as they may 
also encompass cross-earning effects. In this paper, we exploit the specific design of the 
workweek reduction policy implemented in France in the late nineties to overcome these 
issues and to provide one of the very first micro-economic estimates of the effect of an 
exogenous change in individuals’ number of hours worked on the labour supply decisions of 
their spouses.  
In June 1998 the French socialist government passed a law imposing a 10% reduction 
of the legal workweek, from 39 to 35 hours, to be implemented in large firms by January 
2000, and in small firms by January 2002. The law stipulated that employers who would 
implement the new legal norm through a collective agreement with trade unions before the 
deadline would benefit from significant cuts in their payroll taxes. At the same time, the law 
imposed that workers should not experience a decline in their monthly earnings after the 
agreement. The purpose of the reform was to raise the overall employment level via 
worksharing, while at the same time offering firms significant fiscal advantages in order to 
attenuate the impact of higher hourly wages on profitability. Overall, about 300,000 firms 
(employing roughly 35% of the French workforce) signed a collective agreement before the 
come back of the conservative party to power in April 2002 and the interruption of the 
worksharing policy. In over one third of French households the reform induced a noticeable 
change in the workweek regulation of at least one spouse, with no direct impact on family 
income.  
  2This paper uses a unique matched worker-firm dataset obtained by combining the 
French Labour Force Survey with firm level information on the implementation of the shorter 
workweek, in order to estimate the labour supply response of husbands and wives to a 
reduction in the legal workweek of their spouses. We observe an average reduction of about 2 
hours in the workweek of both male and female employees whose employers signed a 
workweek reduction agreement.
2 When looking at spousal responses, we find that wives do 
not adjust their labour supply, whether at the intensive or extensive margin, when their 
husbands become treated. Husbands of treated women, by contrast, tend to work about 0.5 
hours less per week, and this effect is robust whether or not the husband’s own employer 
signed a workweek reduction agreement at the same time as the wife’s employer.  
Further tests reveal that husbands’ labour supply response is not associated with a 
reduction in paid work, and as such should be interpreted as a reduction in some form of 
“unpaid work”, which could reflect a higher take-up rate of paid leaves, or a reduction in 
unpaid overtime. If employees do not use their whole paid leave entitlement, and/or perform 
unpaid overtime work, they have some leeway in cutting their hours while avoiding earnings 
losses, and it seems that it is mostly by adjusting around these unpaid work margins that 
husbands respond to shorter workweek agreements in their wives’ firms.  
These estimates are all the more suggestive as the direct (first-stage) effect of shorter 
workweek agreements on treated wives is estimated to be only about 2 hours. Assuming that 
the workweek reduction in wives’ firms affects husbands only via wives’ number of hours 
worked, we provide an IV estimate of the average cross-hour effect for husbands of 0.24, 
rising to 0.38 for managers and professionals, and to 0.58 for fathers of young children. By 
contrast, the symmetric cross-hour effect on wives’ labour supply is negligible. 
Our estimated spillover effects would imply a value for the social multiplier in 
households’ labour supply in the range 1.1 to 1.3, depending on household composition. That 
is, the equilibrium labour supply response to an exogenous shock is about 10%-30% larger 
than the initial impact. As discussed by Glaeser et al. (2003), the role of social interactions 
and social multipliers may vary widely across behavioural outcomes and levels of 
aggregation, and the French reform provides a unique opportunity to identify the multiplier in 
labour supply at the level of households. 
 
                                                 
2 As discussed below, there are various reasons why the average effect of the shorter legal workweek on actual 
weekly hours is lower than the legal workweek reduction, including the fact that the shorter legal workweek may 
not have been binding for employees initially working below 35 hours.   
  3By looking at labour supply spillovers within households, our paper contributes to the 
existing literature on spouses’ joint labour supply behaviour. This literature typically 
investigates the response of an individual’s labour supply to independent changes to her 
spouse’s income and/or hours of work (Lundberg, 1988). These changes can be in turn driven 
by retirement (Hurd, 1988, and Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000), job loss (Lundberg, 1985, 
Cullen and Gruber, 2000), or tax reforms (Gelber, 2010). While focusing on very different 
sources of variation, these papers tend to agree in documenting significant spillovers in the 
labour supply decisions of spouses. Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we 
exploit independent variation in spousal hours of work, while keeping monthly earnings 
constant. This allows us to abstract from income effects of changes in spouses’ hours worked, 
and focus on pure cross-hour effects. Secondly, while most of the existing literature has 
focused on the labour supply response of secondary earners, we show in this paper that it is in 
fact husbands who significantly cut their working hours following the adoption of the shorter 
workweek in their wives’ workplaces, while the corresponding wives’ response is zero. This 
may be in turn due to different degrees of leisure complementarities in spouses’ utility 
functions, or a higher ability of men to control their working schedules. Thirdly, we provide 
evidence on specific adjustment margins in labour supply spillovers, and specifically we find 
that it is mostly husband’s unpaid involvement in their workplace that is affected when their 
wives’ workweek is reduced.  
Our paper is also related to the literature on work-sharing policies in western 
countries. The study which is closest to ours is Hunt (1998), who shows that the gradual 
decline in “standard working hours” of male, German employees between 1984 and 1994 was 
not accompanied by changes in their wives’ employment rates, but nevertheless produced a 
small decline in their hours of work. These results, while consistent with complementarity 
between spousal leisure, may also reflect underlying trends in female labour supply in 
Germany over this period, including wives’ own gradual exposure to shorter standard 
workweeks. 
Finally, our paper adds to the literature evaluating the effects of the workweek 
reduction in France (see e.g. Askenazy, 2008, Crépon and Kramarz, 2002, Crépon, Leclair 
and Roux, 2004, Estevao and Sa, 2008). Existing evaluations typically compare own 
outcomes for employees in large and small firms, who were exposed to the workweek 
reduction in 2000 and 2002, respectively. In this paper we exploit variation in the exact dates 
of implementation of the workweek reduction across firms to investigate the labour supply 
response of individuals to their spouse’s reduction in working hours. 
  4The paper is organised as follows. Section II gives an overview of the workweek 
reduction reform. Section III describes the data used and provides some graphic analysis of 
the effect of the workweek reduction on treated individuals and their spouses. Section IV 
presents our main regression results. Section V shows robustness of our results to alternative 
identification strategies. Section VI provides IV estimates of cross-hour effects, using 
mandated workweek reductions as instruments for spouse labour supply. Section VII finally 
concludes. 
  
II.   Historical and institutional context  
Since the early eighties, the legal workweek in France has been 39 hours. Overtime wage 
bonus was 25%, and the maximum number of overtime hours per worker was set at 130 per 
year. In 1993, the French economy went through one of the most severe recessions of the 
post-war period, accompanied by a rapid increase in unemployment, reaching the peak rate of 
12% in 1996. In this highly depressed context, the French conservative government passed a 
law offering private firms fiscal incentives to increase their number of employees through a 
workweek reduction (Robien law). The impact of the Robien law was very limited however, 
with less than 3,000 agreements signed with unions, affecting less than 2% of the workforce 
(see Fiole and Roger, 2002). The law did not modify the legal workweek, which remained at 
39 hours. 
In April 1997, the French president Jacques Chirac dissolved the parliament and called 
general elections one year ahead of the end of the legislature. The decision was highly 
unexpected and the following electoral campaign was very short. The socialist party proposed 
a program whose main axis was the reduction of unemployment through worksharing, with 
two basic slogans: “travailler moins pour travailler tous” (work less in order to work all) and 
“35 heures payées 39” (35 worked hours paid 39). The left coalition won the election in June 
1997.  
The workweek reduction was implemented in two successive steps (see Askenazy, 
2008, for a detailed presentation in). The first law (Aubry I) was passed in June 1998. It set 
the legal workweek at 35 hours in the private sector and mandated that the new workweek be 
implemented by January 2000 in firms with more than 20 employees, and by January 2002 in 
smaller firms. Hours worked beyond the 35
th hour would be treated as overtime hours, subject 
to a 25% hourly wage bonus and to a maximum of 130 overtime hours per employee per year.  
Also, the law stipulated that firms who would implement the shorter workweek 
through a collective agreement with unions before the relevant deadline would benefit from a 
  5cut in payroll taxes,
3 provided that they commited to maintain employment levels. Finally, the 
law required that workers should not experience a drop in their monthly earnings following 
the legal workweek reduction. In particular, firms who passed a 35-hours agreement had to 
grant specific (4 hours) bonus to workers paid the monthly minimum wage. The general 
purpose of the law was to induce firms to raise employment levels by worksharing, while 
offering firms fiscal advantages to attenuate any detrimental impact of this reform on 
profitability. 
In January 2000, the second law (Aubry II) introduced several additional regulations in 
order to limit the cost of the shorter workweek for employers. In particular, it became possible 
to implement the shorter workweek via slightly modified definitions of working time, without 
losing eligibility for fiscal aids. For example, it became possible for employers to exclude 
“unproductive breaks” from the definition of working time. Also, it became possible to 
introduce shorter working hours on an annual – rather than weekly – basis, with a cap on 
annual hours being set at 1600. In practice it means that a collective agreement could be 
signed (and fiscal advantages obtained) even with actual reductions of working hours below 
10% (holding definition of work time constant). Most importantly, the new law introduced a 
two-year transitional phase during which it became possible for employers to keep the 39-
hour workweek by using overtime at a reduced 10% rate.
 4 
Two years later, in summer 2002, the conservative party came back to power and the 
whole transition to the shorter workweek was interrupted. Small firms could benefit from a 
postponement of the 35-hour deadline (until 2005). As a consequence, the 35-hour was never 
fully implemented, especially in small private firms. Nevertheless, the Aubry laws have had a 
very large impact on the French economy, with about 350,000 agreements signed 
corresponding to about 10 millions of workers, but the process was finally interrupted long 
before the full implementation of the new norm.  
To sum up, the French workweek reform had several important features: it was 
unexpected and implemented over a relatively short period of time; it has been interrupted, 
with only a fraction only of workers being affected; it did not affect monthly earnings; and 
given its gradual implementation it would likely not treat spouses in a given household at the 
same time.  
                                                 
3 For workers paid at the minimum wage, the tax cut corresponds to a reduction of about 8% in total labour cost 
for 5 years. 
4 Furthermore, employers were not bound to a maximum of 130 overtime hours anymore and no longer required 
to commit to maintain employment levels in order to be eligible for payroll tax cuts.   
  6In the remainder of this paper, we will build on these features of the reform in order to 
evaluate the effect of an exogenous variation in an individual’s workweek on the number of 
hours worked by the other spouse. 
 
III.   Data and descriptive evidence 
 
III. 1 Data 
In this paper we combine individual level information on worker characteristics and working 
hours with firm level information on collective agreements signed by employers who adopted 
the shorter workweek. 
We use individual records from the French Labour Force Surveys (hereafter, LFS), 
which is conducted each year by the French Statistical Office (Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, herafter, INSEE). Before 2003, the LFS is conducted 
every March, and covers a representative sample of about 100,000 households each year (with 
a 1/300 sampling rate). From 2003 onward, the survey is conducted each quarter and covers a 
representative sample of about 55,000 households each quarter. In what follows we use all 
annual surveys for 1994-2002, and the first quarterly survey for 2003-2009.  
For each household member aged 15 or above, the LFS provides information on sex, 
marital status, employment status, occupation, educational level, industry, monthly earnings 
and hours worked during the previous week. Crucial for our purposes, our restricted use 
version of the LFS also provides the identification number of the employer. Specifically, each 
employee is asked to report the name and address of her employer, and this information is 
coded by INSEE. The coded employer identifier is available for just over 80% of the 
employees in the LFS
5. This information allows us to match worker level information with 
firm level information from the “DARES-URSSAF” dataset, an administrative database 
collected by the French Ministry of Labor, which provides detailed information on all firms 
who signed a workweek reduction agreement, including the signing and implementation 
dates. We thus obtain a matched employer-employee dataset containing information on 
working hours of respondents and their spouses (if any), as well as information on when, if at 
all, their employers implemented the shorter workweek.  
                                                 
5 Most cases with missing employer ID correspond to very small firms. For an early use of this information and a 
detailed description of the coding procedure, see Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) and Goux and Maurin 
(1999).  
  7In what follows we focus on a sample of married or cohabiting respondents, whose 
spouse is a wage-earner, and we focus on the labour supply response of respondents to 
spousal exposure to the shorter workweek. We restrict analysis to respondents aged 18-65, 
and drop a small fraction of respondents whose spouses’ firm signed an agreement either 
before 1996 or after 2002, since it is not clear whether these early and late agreements really 
correspond to the reforms implemented in the late 1990s. Our working sample includes 
189,894 males and 236,802 females. We will also look at subsamples of employed 
respondents, workers on high-skill occupations, workers on low-skill occupations, etc.  
III.2 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics on our sample, distinguishing between male 
and female respondents, and by the treatment status of their spouses. Throughout the paper we 
defined as treated all spouses whose employers ever implement a workweek reduction 
agreement. Both men and women are less likely to work in the public sector when they have a 
treated spouse, which is consistent with the reform having mostly affected the private sector. 
But the age and years of education of men are nonetheless very similar whether or not their 
wives are treated, and similarly for women.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of own and spousal legal workweek status in the 
employed sample, and shows that about 54% of husbands of treated wives are non-treated 
themselves by the workweek reduction (Panel A, column 1), while about 29% of husbands of 
non-treated wives are treated. Thus there is some assortative mating along the workweek 
dimension, but spouses have nonetheless different treatment status in a large proportion of 
cases. Also, even when both spouses are treated, the timing of treatment differs for about half 
of couples. Panel B shows a very similar picture for wives of treated and non-treated 
husbands. To further illustrate timing of treatment, Figure 1 graphically shows the gradual 
implementation of the shorter workweek for spouses of employed respondents, i.e. on the 
same sample described in Table 2. While only about a third of employees is eventually treated 
in this sample, there is substantial variation in treatment dates between 1998 and 2002. 
The matched employer-employee dataset used has some clear advantages compared to 
the non-matched LFS, which is typically used in existing evaluations of the French workweek 
reduction. First, it allows us to identify which workers were actually treated, and not simply 
the intention to treat based on the number of employees of their firms and the proximity to the 
law deadlines
6. Also, the information on the exact date of treatment makes it possible to 
                                                 
6 For example, a recent contribution by Ahmed (2009) compares wives’ labour market transitions before and 
after 1998 using the small fraction of wives whose husbands are part-timers in small firms as a control group. 
  8exploit the gradual implementation of the shorter workweek, whereas previous studies had to 
rely on the announced 2000 and 2002 deadlines. In particular, the information on exact dates 
of treatment allows us to separately identify the direct and cross-effects of shorter workweeks 
across spouses, as in the majority of cases the year of treatment differs across spouses.  
 
III. 3  Graphical evidence: Direct and indirect effects of treatment 
Before moving on to our regression analysis, below we provide some simple graphical 
evidence on the direct and indirect effects of the 35-hour reform on the number of hours 
worked by husbands and wives. Figure 2 plots hours worked during the survey week by wives 
who are wage earners, by treatment status (189,894 observations in total). The solid line refers 
to treated women, and time zero refers to the year in which a shorter workweek agreement is 
implemented at their workplace. Their workweek length is stable, if anything slightly rising 
during the pre-treatment years, and drops by about 2 hours upon treatment. The dotted line 
refers to non-treated women, and reports their working hours for the same dates at which 
treated wives were observed. Their hours follow a gradually rising trend throughout the 
sample period, with no break at time 0. Thus we observe a decline of about 2 hours in 
working hours of treated wives relative to control wives at time of the treatment. Interestingly, 
wives that become treated have longer weekly hours initially, and their hours converge almost 
exactly to hours of non-treated wives when their employers adopt the shorter workweek.  
This first-stage effect of the shorter workweek on actual hours worked is about one 
half the shortening in the legal workweek and this may be explained by a number of factors. 
In particular, part of the implementation of the worktime regulation may have taken place 
with slight modifications of working time definition (for example excluding unproductive 
breaks from the hours count) or reducing the number of weeks worked per year rather than the 
number of hours worked per week, keeping usual weekly hours constant (see also Askenazy, 
2008). This would deliver a mitigated effect of the workweek reduction on mean actual hours 
worked, as the survey week falls in March of each year, and thus tends not to coincide with 
popular holiday seasons. Finally, the effect of the introduction of the 35-hour workweek has 
also been mitigated by the fact that about 30% of French female employees work part-time, 
and for them the shorter workweek would not be binding. The estimated 2-hour drop in 
working hours can be interpreted as an average of a higher drop for women initially working 
more than 35 hours, and a smaller drop for women initially working less than 35 hours
7.  
                                                 
7 This specific explanation would not work for men, as the proportion of part-timers among male employees is 
negligible. 
  9Given the behaviour of treated wives, the next question is whether we observe a 
variation in either the employment rate or the number of hours worked by their husbands. 
This is addressed in Figure 3, which shows flat and virtually identical employment patterns of 
husbands of treated and non-treated wives. When focusing on a [-3, +3] years window around 
time of treatment, the difference in employment rates between husbands of treated and non-
treated wives is very small (about 1.5 percentage points) and almost exactly the same before 
and after the date of the treatment. Thus we detect zero spillover effects at the extensive 
margin.  
Figure 4 then addresses the intensive margin, by showing the impact on hours worked 
by the subsample of employed husbands, and reveals a sizeable drop in average working 
hours of husbands of treated wives, relative to husbands of non-treated wives. Specifically, 
the difference in working hours between the treatment and control group was close to zero 
during the five pre-treatment years, and rose to nearly 1 during the 5 post-treatment years.  
These spillover effects may in part reflect the fact that some husbands were themselves 
employed in firms who adopted the shorter workweek, and thus became treated at the same 
date as their wives. To purge this effect out, we replicated the same trends on a sub-sample 
that excludes households in which spouses became treated at the same date (see Figure A1 in 
appendix), and still observe a clear change in the relative number of hours worked by 
husbands of treated wives at the time of treatment. The same result holds when we further 
restrict the sample to households in which the husband was never treated (see Figure A2). In 
the regression analysis that follows we will pool all households and control for own and 
spouse treatment separately.   
Figures 5 to 7 repeat a similar analysis for male employees and their wives. Again we 
observe a clear drop in working hours of treated relative to non-treated husbands (Figure 5), 
whose magnitude is very close to that we observed for wives in Figure 2. However, we find 
no evidence of spillover effects on their wives’ labour supply, either at the extensive margin 
(Figure 6), or the intensive margin (Figure 7).  
To summarize, our descriptive evidence is suggestive of labour supply spillovers at the 
intensive margin for husbands of treated wives, but no spillovers at the extensive margins or 
for wives of treated husbands. In the next section we’ll provide estimates of these effects that 
control for observable characteristics of the individuals, and explore further the nature of 
these spillovers. 
   
IV.   Regression results 
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IV.1   Main estimates 
We focus on two main outcome variables for each individual i in our sample, namely her 
employment status and her weekly hours worked, and assess how each is affected by the 
implementation of a shorter workweek agreement by her spouse’s employer. This would work 
via an effect on the spouse’s labour supply, and thus we initially estimate a first-stage 
specification that regresses spouse working hours on treatment variables and other covariates. 
We denote by HSit the actual weekly hours worked by the spouse, and introduce a dummy 
variable  ASi indicating whether she works for a firm who has ever adopted the shorter 
workweek. Our first-stage regression is the following difference-in-differences specification: 
(1) HSit = γ1XSit+α1ASit+ β1AS-postit + Dt+ uit, 
where AS-postit indicates the period following a workweek reduction in the firm of the spouse, 
Dt denotes a set of year fixed effects, and XSit are relevant individual covariates, including a 
constant term. The β1 coefficient shows the direct effect of workweek regulations on labour 
supply. Table 3 shows the regression results for specification (1) for wives (Panel A) and 
husbands (Panel B). Column (1) in Panel A shows that wives working in firms who 
implemented a workweek reduction agreement were working about 1.36 hour more than 
wives in other firms in the pre-reform period, but then cut their labour supply by about 1.81 
hour per week once the shorter workweek was implemented. This pattern of working hours 
was also evident from Figure 2, and the only difference here is that we control for aggregate 
time effects and a public sector dummy. Turning to husbands, column (1) in Panel B shows 
small pre-treatment differences (-0.28 hour), but again strong and significant effects of the 
workweek reduction (-1.95 hour). All these estimates are robust to the introduction of controls 
for age, education and industry effects in column (2), suggesting that the implementation of 
the shorter workweek was largely orthogonal to these job and worker characteristics.  
Columns (3) and (4) report estimates of a similar specification for (the log of) monthly 
earnings, and once extra controls are included these show near zero effects of the workweek 
reduction on the earnings of wives and husbands. These first-stage results are clearly in line 
with the reform intention to shorten the workweek without cutting monthly earnings of treated 
employees. If anything, the effect of the shorter workweek on the monthly earnings of 
husbands is positive rather than negative, albeit tiny, and only significant at the 10% level. 
We next assess labor supply spillovers by looking at the reduced-form effects of the 
workweek reduction in the spouse firm on the employment status of the main respondent and 
her weekly hours. Note that we can interpret such cross effects as stemming from the sole 
  11reduction in the amount of time spent at work by the spouse once we have ruled out the 
presence of income effects, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Our reduced-form 
specification for employment is 
(2) E it =  γ2Xit + α2ASit + β2AS-postit + Dt + vit, 
where Eit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the employed and 0 for the nonemployed. 
For hours worked, we restrict the sample to employed individuals and estimate  
(3) H it = γ3Xit + α3ASit + β3AS-postit + δ3Ait + θ3A-postit+ Dt + εit, 
where Hit denotes weekly hours conditional on working. The Ait variable is a dummy denoting 
whether the employer of the main respondent has ever implemented a shorter workweek 
agreement whereas A-postit indicates the period following this agreement. The main 
coefficients of interest are β2 in model (2) and β3 in model (3). Note that these specifications 
allow us to estimate cross effects in labor supply (represented by AS-postit), over and above 
the direct effect stemming from the adoption of the shorter workweek in the own firm (A-
postit). These two effects can be separately identified in so far treatment is not simultaneous 
for all spouses.  
The regression results are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) refer to 
employment, and columns (3)-(5) refer to weekly hours. Estimates show no evidence of any 
significant cross effect on employment for either husbands or wives, and the associated point 
estimate is always very close to zero, in line with the trends reported in Figures 3 and 6. As 
we do not find any impact on employment, we can next look at hours worked for those who 
are employed.
8 In column (3) of Panel A we regress husbands’ hours on own treatment 
variables (A and A-post), and on their wives’ treatment variables (AS and AS-post). The own 
treatment effect is again about -1.9
9, and the cross effect is -0.44 and highly significant. When 
their wife becomes treated by the shorter workweek, working men reduce their labour supply 
by nearly half an hour per week. The magnitude of this effect does not change when we 
control for individual characteristics of respondents (column (4)), or when we exclude own 
treatment variables Ait and A-postit (results not reported). Finally, the estimated cross effect 
gets somewhat larger (-0.50 hour) when we exclude husbands who are themselves treated at 
some point during the sample period (column (5)). 
                                                 
8 We also estimated first-stage regressions like (1) for the employed subsamples, and the results are reported in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. The own effect of the shorter workweek is -1.8 hour for wives, and -2.1 hours for 
husbands, and again we find near zero effects on monthly earnings. 
9 Note that the own effect is virtually identical to that estimated in first-stage regressions reported in Panel B of 
Table 3. However the two samples may differ as Panel B of Table 3 covers male employees, and Panel A of 
Table 4 covers husbands of female employees.  
  12Panel B represents parallel estimates for wives. While the own effect of workweek 
regulations is negative and significant, the cross effect is positive, small, and not significantly 
different from zero.  
Our estimates provide one of the very first pieces of evidence showing that changes in 
the workweek of a subsample of employees may have a very significant impact well beyond 
the targeted population. By focusing on the direct effect on targeted population, most existing 
evaluations of workweek reduction policies are likely to underestimate the effect of these 
reforms on overall labour supply. A simple back-of-envelope calculation can help quantify 
overall spillover effects. In particular, the adoption of the shorter workweek has implied a 
reduction of nearly two hours in the labour supply of married women, and nearly half an hour 
in the labour supply of their husbands. Assuming for simplicity that the same probability of 
treatment (0.35) and the same first stage effect (-2 hours) would apply to all categories of 
workers, the average direct effect of the reform on the male labour supply would be 
 hours, whereas the average cross effect would be  7 . 0 2 35 . 0 − = × − 11 . 0 5 . 0 61 . 0 35 . 0 − = × × −  
hours, where 0.61 represents the proportion of male workers who are married to a female 
wage earner. Thus neglecting indirect effects would underestimate the overall impact of the 
workweek reduction on male labour supply by about 0.11/(0.11+0.7) = 13%. Given that men 
represent about half of the overall employed population, it would underestimate its impact on 
the overall population by about 0.11/(0.11+0.7+0.7) = 7.3%. 
 
IV.2   Further estimates: Cross effects on paid and unpaid work  
We have shown that, following a workweek reduction at their workplaces, wives work 1.8 
hours less per week at constant earnings, and their husbands respond by cutting their labour 
supply by about half an hour. The aim of this section is to assess the nature of these labour 
supply spillovers.  
If husbands’ labour supply response reflects a reduction in “unpaid” worktime, the 
estimated cross-hour effect could be unambiguously driven by spousal complementarities in 
non-market time. By contrast, if husbands’ response involves a cut in paid worktime, it may 
also be the consequence of a substitution of wives’ non-market activities for some family 
expenditure. For example, husbands may cut their paid hours simply because their wives use 
their additional non-market time to substitute for paid child-care. 
The most direct way to explore this question is to test whether respondents’ earnings 
are negatively affected by the workweek reduction in their spouses’ firms. The two first 
columns of Table 5 show that it is clearly not the case. Using the same reduced-form 
  13specification as in Table 3, we find that if anything a workweek reduction agreement in the 
wife’s workplace is associated which a 0.8% increase in husband’s earnings, and this effect is 
hardly significant at the 10% level. This finding thus suggests that cross effect on husbands’ 
labour supply mostly corresponds to a reduction in unpaid work.  
To take this argument one step further, one should ideally exploit information on cross 
spouse effects on margins such as paid absences, absenteeism, or unpaid overtime. 
Unfortunately, detailed information on overtime and vacation time is only available in the 
LFS since 2003, well beyond the period of implementation of the workweek reduction reform.  
The only indirectly related evidence that one could exploit for the earlier period is 
information on the difference between actual hours (that we denoted by H) and usual hours 
(that we will denote by Hu), defined as the number of hours worked in a typical week
10. We 
define as overtime the magnitude (H-Hu)
+=(H-Hu)*I(H-Hu>0), and as unworked hours the 
magnitude (H-Hu)
-=(H-Hu)*I(H-Hu<0). Of course these are both weekly-aggregated measures, 
thus someone who works one hour longer than the typical workday for three days in a week 
and one hour shorter for the remaining two days would represent a case of overtime work 
according to our definition, and this simply means that her overtime hours more than offset 
her unworked hours during the week. Overall, usual hours Hu are defined for about 85% of 
individuals in our sample, and they coincide with actual hours worked H in only 73% of 
cases. We observe overtimes hours, i.e. H>Hu, in about 11.6% of cases and unworked hours, 
H<Hu, in about 15.3% of cases. Conditional on H<Hu, 57% of cases correspond to workers 
who did not work al all during the survey week, and among them the average of (H-Hu)
- is -
38, and 43% of cases correspond to workers who worked positive hours but still below their 
usual workweek, and among them the average of (H-Hu)
- is -10. Conditional on H>Hu, the 
average number of overtime hours is 7.4.  
In theory, variations in (H-Hu)
+ or (H-Hu)
- may be associated with variations in both 
paid or unpaid work. Specifically, (H-Hu)
+ may include both paid and unpaid overtime hours, 
whereas (H-Hu)
- may capture both paid and unpaid absences from work. In practice, we find 
that while overtime hours do translate into higher earnings, unworked hours typically do not 
imply earnings losses. To illustrate this, Table A2 in the Appendix reports estimates from 
regressions of monthly earnings on Hu, (H-Hu)
+ and (H-Hu)
- separately for the 1994-2002 
                                                 
10According to the official ILO (2002) definition, usual hours per week represent “the modal value of the number 
of hours actually worked per week over a long period of time”. This definition is applicable to workers with 
regular schedules only (about 85% of cases in the LFS). It does not include irregular or unusual overtime 
(whether worked for a premium pay or not compensated at all) nor unusual absence or rest.   
  14period.
11 Column 2 shows that earnings only respond significantly to usual and overtime 
hours, whereas unworked hours have no discernible impact, and columns 3-6 show that this 
result holds true within both the treated and the control sample. Thus variation in unworked 
hours seems to reflect variation in unpaid work.  
To summarize, we have shown that the cross-hour effect for husbands is not associated 
with an earnings loss, and that in general variations in unworked hours are not associated with 
variations in earnings, while overtime hours are. The next question is whether the estimated 
cross-hour effect is indeed driven by a response in unworked hours. To this purpose, columns 
3-6 of Table 5 repeat our reduced-form specification (3) using Hu, H-Hu, (H-Hu)
+ and (H-Hu)
- 
as dependent variables in turn. Interestingly, regressions show a sizeable cross-hour effect 
only for unworked hours, but none on either usual hours or overtime hours. In other words, 
the only hours concept that responds to spousal workweek treatment is one that typically 
would not have a discernible impact on earnings.  
This analysis confirms that husbands’ cross hour effects occur via a cut in unpaid work 
and thus it can be unambiguously interpreted as a consequence of complementarities in 
spousal nonmarket activities, most likely in leisure time. The reduction in unpaid worktime 
could in turn happen through an increase in the take-up rate of paid leave, or a rise 
absenteeism, or a cut in unpaid overtime.
12 No direct information on these margins is 
available for the sample period of interest, but according to 2003-2009 LFS surveys, about 
12% of male employees declare that their paid holiday entitlement exceeded the amount of 
paid leave actually taken by one week or more, 23% declare to have worked overtime in the 
survey week, and that over 61% of their overtime hours were unpaid. For employees in high-
skill occupations, about 37% have been working overtime, and about 84% of their overtime 
hours were not remunerated (see Appendix Table A3). These data are suggestive of 
significant leeway for most employees, and especially the highly skilled, in reducing their 
unpaid involvement in the workplace. The next subsection investigates such heterogeneous 
response in spousal labour supply.  
 
IV.3   Heterogeneous Cross-Hour effects 
                                                 
11 Information on Hu is only available for the pre-2003 period. 
12As mentioned above, as our measure of unworked hours is aggregated at the weekly level, husbands who report 
unworked hours in a given week may have worked overtime on some days of the week, and may cut on this 
margin when their wives become treated. 
  15As Table A3 shows, workers in high-skill occupations typically work longer hours than the 
less-skilled and are also more likely to do overtime work. High skill occupations include 
managers, engineers and professionals at various levels (cadres in the French classification of 
occupations), and cover about 20% of the employed workforce. About 51% of males in these 
occupations work more than 45 weekly hours, while only 24% of those in less-skilled 
occupations do so. For women, the proportions are 21% and 8% respectively. Moreover, high-
skill workers typically have higher control over the organization of their workweek. One 
could therefore expect that high-skill workers are more likely to respond to change in their 
spouses’ work week than the less-skilled, who are instead more likely to work the legal 
workweek and therefore would only be able to cut their working hours via new contractual 
agreements.  
To test this assumption, we replicate our previous analysis separately for husbands on 
high-skill occupations, and other husbands. The results are reported in Table 6, which shows 
in column (1) a strong and significant first-stage effect of the shorter workweek on wives’ 
working hours, which is somewhat higher for wives of managers and professionals than for 
other wives. Interestingly, the associated cross effect on hours is about three times larger for 
managers and professionals than for other workers (column 2). In particular, managers and 
professionals cut their worktime by nearly one hour when their wives are treated, while the 
corresponding figure for workers in other occupations is about 19 minutes, and this effect is 
only borderline significant. One can draw similar conclusions looking at the probability of 
working more than 45 hours weekly (column 3), which shows that wives’ treatment lowers 
the likelihood of a long workweek for husbands in managerial or professional jobs by 4 
percentage points, representing an 8% reduction on the baseline proportion of 51%. Spillover 
effects on husbands’ labour supply thus seem a lot stronger for the high-skilled than for the 
less-skilled.  
We further explore spousal labour supply responses in households with young 
children, as compared to other households. It has been argued that the interdependence of 
spousal labour supply may be stronger when there are young children in the household, as 
children appear to play the role of a “jointly-consumed commodity” for husbands and wives 
(Lundberg, 1988). To test this assumption, Table 7 replicates previous regressions for 
households with at least one child aged 0-6 and for other households separately. In first-stage 
regressions of column 1, we find weaker reductions in weekly hours for mothers of young 
children (-1.30) than for other women (-2.08). This difference is to be expected, as about 37% 
of mothers of children aged 0-6 work part-time, as opposed to 30% for other women, and for 
  16part-timers the mandatory workweek reduction would not necessarily be binding (Bloch-
London and al., 2003). Moving to reduced-form regressions in column 2, the reaction of 
husbands to their wives’ treatment is noticeably stronger in households with young children 
than in other households, despite a weaker first-stage effect. The presence of at least one 
young child thus clearly increases the reaction of husbands’ labour supply to their wives 
working hours. Again we did not detect any similar spillovers for wives. 
 
 
V Robustness  checks 
 
V.1   Alternative Identification 
The previous analysis uses two basic sources of identification for the spillover effects of 35-
hour agreements. Namely it exploits the fact some spouses are treated whereas others are not, 
and the fact that not all treated spouses are treated at the same date. To check the robustness 
of our estimates, Table 8 replicates the previous regressions using separately these two 
sources of identification separately. Specifically, the first-stage regression is based the 
following specification,  
(4)   HSit= γ4XSit + α41ASit + α42ASit*(1998≤t≤2002) + 
+ β41ASit*(t>2002) + β42 AS-postit*(t≤2002) + Dt+ ηit. 
Holding ASit constant, the β41 coefficient compares hours worked by those ever treated to 
hours of the nontreated. By contrast, holding ASit*(1998≤t≤2002) constant, the β42 coefficient 
compares hours worked by those treated later to hours worked by those treated earlier.
13  
Columns 1 and 2 in the Table 8 show the estimated effects on wives’ hours and 
earnings. Comfortingly, estimated α41 and α42 are both negative, highly significant, very 
similar to each other and very close to the overall effect obtained with the basic specification 
(see Table 3). Column 3 shows β41 and β42 the two corresponding cross effects on husbands’ 
hours. Most interestingly, these two effects are negative, significant, and close to each other. 
Also, these estimates are similar to those obtained with the basic specification (see Table 3). 
Turning to females, the estimated cross effects are still negative, but smaller in magnitude and 
not significantly different from zero at standard levels, regardless of the source of 
identification (results not reported).  
 
                                                 
13Note that AS-post ≡ AS-post*(t≤2002) +AS*(t>2002) so that Model (3) and Model (4) are nested. In particular, 
Model (3) is a special case of Model (4), in which we impose α41=α42 and β41= β42. 
  17V.2 Fixed-effect estimates 
The French LFS has a rotating panel dimension, with one third of the sample being replaced 
each year, and each household typically staying in the sample for two years (three surveys). In 
this section we exploit this longitudinal component to provide panel estimates of the effect of 
the shorter workweek on spousal labour supply. An important caveat is that the longitudinal 
dimension available is quite short, and spells of observation of respondents only rarely 
overlap with the adoption of the shorter workweek in their spouses’ firms. Even when we 
focus on the 1998-2002 period
14, only about 10% of respondents surveyed are observed both 
before and after the implementation of the shorter workweek in their spouses’ firms (see 
Table 9). Overall, only about 23,000 male and 29,000 female respondents can actually 
contribute to the identification of changes in spouses’ firm regulation on respondents’ labour 
supply.   
With these caveats in mind, we replicate previous regressions controlling for 
individual fixed. Table 10 reports estimates of reduced-form effects on employment, hours 
and earnings. Employment and earnings effects of the shorter workweek are again nil. The 
direct hours effect is negative and significant for both women (-1.22) and men (-1.21), 
although this is somewhat smaller than the effect detected in cross-section estimates of Table 
3. As fixed-effect estimates focus by construction on short-term effects of worktime 
agreements, while cross-sectional estimates exploit a longer horizon, one may think that the 
difference between the two may be due to some gradual implementation of the shorter 
workweek. Figures 2 and 5 show that this may be the case for husbands, though not for wives. 
Another possible interpretation is that panel estimates may be more seriously affected by 
measurement error in the actual date of implementation of the shorter workweek, which 
would generate a stronger attenuation bias in fixed-effect estimates. The cross hour effect for 
husbands is negative, although this only becomes significant when one looks at the difference 
between actual and usual hours, and again it is the amount of unworked hours that is adjusted 
following wives’ shorter workweeks (-0.8 hour). For wives, the cross-hour effect is either 
positive or close to zero, but never statistically significant. Overall, our main findings are 
robust to the introduction of individual fixed-effects, although the significance of various 
effects is reduced in this smaller sample. 
 
                                                 
14Households surveyed either before 1998 or after 2002 did not experience any changes in working time 
regulations while in our panel, and thus cannot contribute to the identification of the effect of these changes on 
spousal labour supply. Our panel estimates thus focus on the 1998-2002 period.  
  18VI. Instrumental  variable  estimates of cross-hour effects 
There is a long standing tradition of labour supply models in which the labour supply 
decisions of married couples are treated as two-person games in which the labour supply of 
each spouse depends not only on own potential wage or unearned income, but also on the 
number of hours spent at work by the other spouse (see e.g. Elroy and Horney, 1981, 
Lundberg, 1988). These models are hard to estimate since they involve a system of two 
simultaneous equations in which wives’ hours feature in the husbands’ labour supply equation 
and vice versa, and good instruments for independent variation in the labour supply of one of 
the spouses are typically hard to find. 
While the previous sections have highlighted the reduced-form effect of workweek 
regulations on spousal labour supply, in this section we use workweek regulations in an 
individual’s firm as an instrument for her working hours in her spouse’s labour supply 
equation. As well known, both reduced form parameters and IV estimates are of interest in 
their own right. The former is most policy relevant, as the Government can directly control 
the adoption of the shorter workweek, but of course cannot directly control spousal labour 
supply. Also, reduced form estimates would not require as an exclusion restriction that 
workweek regulations affect spousal labour supply only via their effect on the labour supply 
of directly treated employees. However, if one is willing to accept this (reasonable) exclusion 
restriction, IV estimates provide the appropriate structural parameter for measuring how 
labour supply responds to independent changes in labour supply of one’s spouse.  
Below we estimate the impact of spousal hours on own hours, having instrumented 
spousal hours by AS-post variables. The regression results are reported in Table 11 for both 
husbands (Panel A) and wives (Panel B), using the same samples and specifications as in 
Tables 4, 6 and 7. Unsurprisingly, while we detect no significant cross-hour effect for wives 
on either the whole sample or any subsample, for husbands the cross-hour effect is always 
positive and significant. Among husbands the cross-hour effect in labour supply is about 
twice as large for managers and professionals than for other occupations, and in particular 
when their wives cut their labour supply by one hour, men in high occupations respond to by 
cutting their own labour supply by about 20 minutes. Also, cross hour effects are three times 
larger when there are young children in the household, relative to childless families. The 
quantitative response for fathers is about 35 minutes for each extra hour spent at home by 
their wives, thus suggesting that worktime policy evaluations restricted to direct labour supply 
effects may strongly underestimate its impact on the time spent by fathers with their young 
children. 
  19Overall, our estimated cross-hour effects lie between 0.2 and 0.6 for husbands and are 
negligible for wives. These results translate into social multipliers in households’ labour 
supply lying between 1+0.2/2 =1.1 and 1+0.6/2=1.3, which means that the equilibrium labour 
supply response to exogenous shocks affecting both spouses is up to 1.1 or 1.3 time the initial 
response. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides one of the very first micro-
economic evaluation of multiplier in labour supply at the household level. 
 
VII   Conclusions 
This paper has investigated cross-hour effects on the labour supply of husbands and wives 
using independent variation in spousal hours generated by the introduction of the shorter 
workweek in France in the late 1990s. Our identification strategy exploits observed variation 
in working hours between treated and non-treated spouses, as well as staggered treatment 
dates among the treated.  
We found that female and male employees treated by the shorter legal workweek 
reduced their weekly labour supply by about 2 hours, and did not experience any reduction in 
their monthly earnings. While wives of treated men did not seem to adjust their working time 
at either the intensive or extensive margins, husbands of treated wives responded by cutting 
their workweek by about half an hour to one hour, according to specifications and samples. In 
particular, this effect is stronger among managers and professionals, and fathers of young 
children. Most importantly, we find that husbands labour supply response is not associate to 
an earnings’ loss, and reflect cuts in unpaid work. This result suggests significant spousal 
complementarities in leisure time for husbands, and namely when a wife’s workweek is 
reduced, the increase in her leisure time raises the value of leisure for her husband and 
reduces his labour supply. Other mechanisms, working for example through changes in home 
production and its outsourcing to the market, do not seem consistent with the observed labour 
supply response of husbands at constant earnings.   
Finally, by focusing on the direct effect on targeted population, most existing 
evaluations of workweek reduction policies are likely to underestimate the effect of these 
reforms on labour supply in general, and in particular on the time spent by parents with their 
young children. A simple back-of-envelope calculation suggests any policy that would neglect 
spousal labour supply spillover would likely underestimate the overall impact on male labour 
supply by about 13%.  
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Panel A    Males   
  Full sample  Employed only 
  Wife not treated  Wife treated   Wife not treated  Wife treated  
Years of education  12.7  12.4  12.9  12.5 
Age  42.6 41.9 41.7 41.0 
High-skill  occupation  17.7 14.2 19.4 15.4 
Private sector   57.1  66.2  64.9  74.6 
      
Spouse’s year of educ.  13.1  12.7  13.2  12.8 
Spouse’s  age  40.5 39.7 39.7 39.0 
Spouse in high-skill occ.  11.1  8.1  11.3  8.3 
Spouse in private sector  54.3  90.2  54.4  90.4 
No.  observations  130,468 59,426 114,705 52,755 
Panel B    Females   
  Full sample  Employed only 
  Husband not 
treated  
Husband treated  Husband not 
treated  
Husband treated 
Years of Education  12.6  12.4  13.0  12.8 
Age  39.4 39.5 39.5 39.5 
High-skill occupation (%)  7.4  5.7  10.4  7.8 
Private sector (%)  42.7  47.5  63.0  69.9 
      
Spouse’s year of educ.  12.5  12.2  12.7  12.4 
Spouse’s  age  41.5 41.6 41.4 41.5 
Spouse in high-skill occ. (%)  18.7  16.7  19.3  16.6 
Spouse in private sector (%)  72.4  93.6  70.1  92.9 
No.  observations  150,371 86,431 101,923 58,766 
Notes: interpretation of figures for main respondent and their spouses is as follows: The average number of years of 
education for men whose wife is not treated is 12.7. The average number of years of education for their wives is 13.1. 
Source: Labour force surveys, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Distribution of Own Firm Status, by Firm Status of the Spouse. 
 
Panel A  Sample : Employed men 
  Wife treated   Wife not treated  
    
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek  54.2  71.0 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek  45.8  29.0 
    - not same year as wife’s firm  22.8  29.0 
    - same year as wife’s firm  23.0  - 
Total   100  100 
Panel B  Sample : Employed women 
  Husband treated   Husband not treated  
    
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek  58.1  73.2 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek  41.9  26.8 
   - not same year as wife’s firm  21.3  26.8 
   - same year as wife’s firm  20.6  - 
Total   100  100 
Panel A: Sample of married (or cohabiting) male employees, whose spouse is an employee.  
Panel B: Sample of married (or cohabiting) female employees, whose spouse is an employee. 
Reading: Among male employees whose spouse works in a treated firm, 45.8% are working in a treated firm. 
  24Table 3 
Direct Effects of Workweek Reduction Agreements on Hours Worked and Earnings. 
 
Panel A  Wives 




 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
















Additional controls   no  yes    no  yes 
          
No. Observations  189,894  189,894    160,046  160,046 
Panel B  Husbands 




 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
















Additional controls   no  yes    no  yes 
          
No. Observations  236,802  236,802   201,559  201,559 
Notes: The main samples (columns 1 and 2) include married (or cohabiting) individuals, whose spouse is an 
employee. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the subsample on which earnings are collected (from 2003 onward, 
information is collected on one third of the LFS sample only). The table shows the results of regressing spouse’s 
hours (YS) and earnings (WS) on the status of spouse’s firm (AS) and on whether an agreement is on in spouse’s 
firm (AS-post). Baseline control variables are 15 year dummies and a dummy indicating whether spouse works in 
public sector. Additional controls are spouse’s years of education, age, age square and 16 industry dummies. 
Source: Labour force surveys, 1994-2009. 
 
.
  25Table 4 
Cross Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Employment and Hours Worked. 
 
Panel A  Husbands 
 Employment 
 
 Hours  Worked   
(conditional on employment) 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) 
         
































Add.  Controls    no yes    no yes yes 
          
No. Observations  189,894  189,894    167,460 167,460  156,392 
Panel B  Wives 
 Employment 
 
 Hours  Worked   
(conditional on employment) 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) 
         
































Add.  Controls    no yes    no yes yes 
          
No. Observations  236,802  236,802    160,689 160,689  150,371 
Notes: The main samples (columns 1 and 2) are the same as in Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the employed 
subsamples, and column 5 further excludes respondents who were treated at the same time of their spouse. The 
table shows the results of regressing individuals’ employment (E) and hours worked (H) on the status of spouse’s 
firm (AS), on the status of own firm (A), on whether an agreement is on in spouse’s firm (AS-post) and on 
whether an agreement is on in own firm (A-post). In columns 1 and 2, baseline control variables are 15 year 
dummies and a dummy indicating whether spouse works in the public sector. Additional controls in column 2 
are spouse’s years of education, age and age square, and respondent years of education, age and age square. For 
columns 3 to 5, baseline controls are 15 year dummies, a public sector dummy, a wage-earner dummy and a 
dummy indicating whether spouse works in the public sector. Additional controls in columns 4 and 5 include 
spouse’s years of education, age, age square and 16 industry dummies, and respondent years of education, age, 
age square and 16 industry dummies. Source: Labour force surveys, 1994-2009. 
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(H -Hu)
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No Obs.  124 417  101 138    101 138  101 138  101 138  101 138 
Samples: Column 1: married (or cohabiting) male employees whose spouse is an employee; Columns 2-6: 1994-
2002 sub-sample with usual weekly hours. Regressions include same set of control variables as model (4) in 
Table 4.  Source: Labour force surveys, 1994 to 2009 (column 1) and 1994 to 2002 (columns 2 to 6). 
 
  27Table 6 
Direct and Cross Effects of the Shorter Workweek in Wives’ Firms,  
by Husband’s Occupation. 
 
Panel A   Sample: Employed Men, high-skill occupations 
  Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours   Husband’s hours ≥ 45 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 












      
No. Observations  30,432  30,432  30,432 
Panel B  Sample: Employed Men, other occupations 
  Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours   Husband’s hours ≥ 45 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 












      
No. Observations  137,028  137,028  137,028 
Notes: high-skill occupations include managers, professionals, engineers and associate occupations. In column 1, 
control variables are as in column 4 of Table 3. In columns 2 and 3, control variables are as in column 4 of Table 4. 
  28Table 7 
Direct and Cross Effects of the Shorter Workweek in Wives’ Firms, by Family Types. 
 
Panel A   Sample: Employed Men, Households with at least one child aged 0-6 
  Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours   Husband’s hours ≥ 45 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 












     
No. Observations  39,468  39,468  39,468 
Panel B  Sample: Employed Men, Other households  
  Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours   Husband’s hours ≥ 45 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 












     
No. Observations  127,992  127,992  127,992 
Notes: control variables are as in Table 6. 
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Table 8 
Direct and Cross Effects of the Shorter Workweek in Wives’ firms:  
Alternative Specifications. 
 
  Sample: Employed Men 
  Wife’s hours  Wife’s earnings  Husband’s hours 
  (1) (2) (3) 






     






     






     






     
 A-post  - -  -1.96 
(0.14) 
     
 A  - -  -0.09 
(0.11) 
     
No.  Observations  167,460 141,623 167,460 
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, control variables are the same as in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3. In column 








Number of Observations per Respondent and Proportion of Switchers 
 
  Sample male respondents 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
respondents 
Total number  
observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ Firms 
      
1  26 231  26 231  - 
2  13 916  27 832  11,9% 
3  9 073  27 219  17,9% 
All  49 220  81 282  10,1% 
  Sample female respondents 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
respondents 
Total number  
observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ Firms 
      
1  31 110  31 110  - 
2  17 292  34 584  14,1% 
3  11 901  35 703  22,6% 
All  60 303  101 397  12,8% 
Notes: the sample includes individuals living in couple and whose spouse is an employee. Source: Labour Force 
Surveys, 1998 to 2002, Insee. 
Reading: 13 916 male respondents are observed at two dates and 11.9% have a spouse whose firm passed an 
agreement between these two dates.   
 
 
  31Table 10 
Cross Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Employment and Hours: Panel Regressions 
 
 













  Type of hours 
































































Obs. 81,282  63,796 63,796    56,941 56,941 56,941  56,941 













  Type of hours 
































































Obs. 101,397  67,133 67,133    63,236 63,236 63,236  63,236 
Notes: the main sample (column 1) is the same as in Table 3. Columns 2 and 3 refer to the employed subsample 
whereas columns 4 to 7 further exclude workers without usual weekly hours. Controls include individuals fixed 
effects as well as the same baseline and additional control variables as in Table 4 Source: Labour Force surveys, 
1998 to 2002, Insee. 
 
  32Table 11 
Cross-hour Effects, IV Estimates. 
 
Panel A  
 
Sample: Employed men 
Dependent variable: Weekly hours worked 
 








 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










No. Observations  167,460  30,432  137,028  39,468  127,992 
Panel B  
 
Sample: Employed women 
Dependent variable: Weekly hours worked 
 








 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










No. Observations  160,689  15,217  145,472  36,959  123,730 
Panel A: Estimates reported show the effect of spousal labour supply on the main respondent’s labour supply, 
using treatment of spousal firm (AS-post) as an instrument. The corresponding reduced-form results are reported 
in Tables 4, 6 and 7. Controls included are a dummy variable for type of spouse firm (AS), 15 year dummies, a 
wage-earner dummy, a public sector dummy, spouse’s years of education, age, age square, 16 spouse’s industry 
dummies and a dummy indicating whether spouse works in public sector. 
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Figure 5: Working time regulation in husbands' firm
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Table A1 
Direct Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Hours Worked and Earnings.  
Subsample of employed individuals. 
 
Panel A  Wives 




 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
        
















Add. Controls  no yes    No yes 
          
No. Observations  167 460  167 460    141 623  141 623 
Panel B  Husbands 
 Hours  Worked    Earnings 
 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
        
















Add. Controls  no yes    no yes 
        
No. Observations  160 689  160 689    135 729  135 729 
Notes: The main samples include married (or cohabiting) employees, whose spouse is an employee. Columns 3 
and 4 refer to the sub-samples for which spouses’ earnings are observed. The table shows the results of 
regressing spouse’s hours (YS) and earnings (WS) on the status of spouse’s firm (AS) and on whether an 
agreement is on in spouse’ firm (AS-post). Same controls as in Table 3. Source: LFS, 1994-2009. 
 
  38Table A2 
Usual Hours, Actual Hours and Husbands’ Monthly Earnings. 
 
  Dep. Variable: monthly earnings 
  All   Pre-Reform  Post-reform 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 














Actual– Usual weekly 


























Observations  101 138  101 138  89 822  89 822  11 316  11 316 
Sample: The main sample includes married (or cohabiting) male employees, with usual weekly hours. Column 3 
and 4 refer to the subsample observed in firms which have not passed a shorter workweek agreement or which 
status is unknown. The post-reform columns (5) and (6) focus on the sub-sample of employees observed in firms 
which have already passed a shorter workweek agreement. All regressions include respondents’ age, education, 
industry as well as time dummies as additional controls. Source: Labour force surveys, 1994 to 2002, Insee. 
 
  39Table A3 
Overtime hours and paid holidays. 
  
  One or more week 












that are paid 
(%) 
Men      
  All men  12.4  23.0  7h06m  39.0 
  High-skill occupations  14.0  36.6  8h47m  16.4 
  Other occupations  11.9  20.4  6h31m  46.7 
Women      
  All women  15.3  16.5  5h16m  26,5 
  High-skill occupations  13.4  31.9  6h53m  13.0 
  Other occupations  15.6  14.8  4h53m  29.7 
Notes: high-skill occupations include managers, professionals, engineers and associate occupations. Sample: married or cohabitating 
individuals, whose spouse in an employee (column 1). Columns 2, 3 and 4 exclude employees with no usual hours. Source: Labour 
force surveys, 2003-2009. 
 
  40Figure A1: Husbands' Hours Worked, by Firm Status of the Wife (Excluding 
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